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TOWARD A CIVIL JURY-TRIAL DEFAULT RULE
Richard Lorren Jolly*
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require litigants to affirma-
tively assert their Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury.  Failure
to do so defaults the proceedings to trial by judge.  This jury-waiver
default emerged at the federal level in 1938 and has remained unal-
tered since.  But recently, Justice Neil Gorsuch and Judge Susan Gra-
ber recommended the Advisory Committee adopt a jury-trial default,
such that a litigant would receive a jury trial unless it was affirmatively
waived.1  This Article expounds upon their brief proposal, reviewing
the history of the jury-waiver default, the purported benefits of a jury-
trial default, and the potential detriments of adopting the proposed
rule.
The jury-waiver default emerged at the federal level concomitantly
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the merging of the
courts of law and equity.  Nothing about merged courts, however, ne-
cessitated automatic waiver.  Instead, the initial drafters of the Federal
Rules adopted this approach for two reasons.  First, it offered easy
and efficient administration.  It settled the mode of dispute resolution
early, simplifying the process for judges and preventing a party from
asserting her jury right in such a way as to secure a strategic advan-
tage.2  Second, automatic waiver was adopted in order to limit the
number of jury trials.  The initial advisory committee members were
pro-judge, if not explicitly anti-jury, in their thinking.3  That a jury-
waiver default would lead parties to forfeit their right and drive down
the number of jury trials was understood and intentional.4
* Research Fellow to the Civil Jury Project, New York University School of Law.  Thank you
to Judges Lee Rosenthal and William Young, as well as Professors Kellen Funk, Alexandra
Lahav, Rene´e Lerner, Suja Thomas, and Stephen Yeazell. All errors are, of course, my own.
1. See Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch & Hon. Susan P. Graber, Suggestion 16-CV-F in COMMITTEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
2017-01-standing-agenda_book_0.pdf [hereinafter Suggestion 16-CV-F].
2. See infra notes 33–38.
3. See infra notes 39–46.
4. See infra Section I.
685
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-4\DPL402.txt unknown Seq: 2  8-MAY-18 13:57
686 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:685
Justice Gorsuch and Judge Graber’s recommendation suggests that
neither of these rationales persists today.  The reasons animating their
proposal are concise enough to be reproduced in their entirety:
First, we should be encouraging jury trials, and we think that this
change would result in more jury trials.  Second, simplicity is a vir-
tue.  The present system, especially with regard to removed cases,
can be a trap for the unwary.  Third, such a rule would produce
greater certainty.  Fourth, a jury-trial default honors the Seventh
Amendment more fully.  Finally, many states do not require a spe-
cific demand.  Although we have not looked for empirical studies,
we do not know of negative experiences in those jurisdictions.5
In this brief paragraph the judges make three main contentions: The
rule will increase the number of jury trials, ease administration, and be
truer to the Constitution.
Some of the judges’ contentions are more persuasive than others.
Accepting their position that more jury trials is constitutionally desira-
ble, it is unclear whether the proposed change would yield that result.
Data on the number of jury trials inadvertently waived due to the cur-
rent rule is unavailable.  However, consideration of the many other
factors contributing to the historically low rate of jury trials suggests
that changing the default is unlikely to revive the enfeebled institu-
tion.  Nevertheless, the judges are correct in asserting that a jury-trial
default will increase certainty and simplify the administrative process
in removed proceedings.  They are also correct to highlight the sym-
bolic significance of adopting a default rule reflecting the civil jury’s
importance as a constitutional actor.
Notwithstanding these benefits, the proposed rule might carry un-
desirable consequences.  It could result in an increase in the number
of pro se litigants entitled to a jury trial.  But while pro se litigants
impose costs on the judicial system, many of their claims are disposed
of through pretrial motions.  Regardless, procedural rules should not
be traps for the unrepresented.  Furthermore, the initial advisory com-
mittee’s purported fears of strategic assertion of jury rights had more
to do with when a mode of trial must be settled than with the given
default rule.  A near-century of experience has made determining
which claims are entitled to a jury trial far more certain.  Where de-
bate persists, the issue can be resolved just as easily in the presump-
tive shadow of a jury trial.
5. Suggestion 16-CV-F, supra note 1.
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I. HISTORY OF THE JURY-WAIVER DEFAULT RULE
Nothing about merged courts of law and equity necessitates a jury-
waiver default.  Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, many
states had already merged their courts and maintained a jury-trial de-
fault.6  It must be stressed that the initial drafters of the Federal Rules
made an affirmative decision to adopt automatic wavier.  They did so
based on claims of administrative efficiency, but also with the intent to
decrease the number of jury trials.7
To understand how dramatic the shift to a jury-waiver default re-
gime was, one must remember that nonjury trials did not exist at com-
mon law.  Trial by jury was—with a few obscure exceptions—the only
form of trial used in courts of law in the United States.8  One of the
most significant distinctions between courts of law and equity was the
consistent presence of a jury in the former.9  The procedural rules for
the separate courts were chiefly animated by this distinction. In courts
of law, the rigid writ system required complex claims to be simplified
into easily cognizable trials such that juries could readily comprehend
and resolve disputes.10  Courts of equity, in which no jury right ex-
isted, employed highly flexible procedures that granted judges tre-
mendous discretion in crafting resolutions.11
This began to change during the mid-nineteenth century.  In 1846,
New York became the first state to alter its constitution to allow liti-
gants to waive their right to a civil jury “in the manner to be pre-
scribed by law.”12  The Field Code, named after its principal drafter
David Dudley Field, was enacted shortly thereafter.  That Code
merged New York’s courts of law and equity, but also permitted jury
waiver in three ways: (1) by failing to appear at the trial; (2) by written
consent, in person or by attorney, filed with the clerk; or (3) by oral
consent in open court, entered in the minutes.13  Critically, it did not
require a litigant to make an affirmative jury demand.
6. See infra notes 19–26 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 32–48 and accompanying text.
8. See ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 260–61 (1952) (noting the exceptions).
9. Id.
10. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 963 (1987).
11. Id.
12. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1846).
13. N.Y. LAWS, c. 379 § 221 (71st Sess., Apr. 12, 1848).
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The Field Code’s justification for allowing waiver appears to be the
result of New York’s concomitant shift to an elected judiciary.14  Some
have suggested that the rule reflected the drafters’ perception that
elected judges, like juries, were more likely to be representative of the
community.15  Alternatively, others have noted that it was part of a
general shift toward displacing civil juries.16  Justice Limpkin of the
Supreme Court of Georgia took note of the air in 1848, stating: “[I]t is
notorious, that modern law reform . . . seeks . . . to dispense as much
as possible with juries.”17  To support this proposition, Justice Limpkin
erroneously cited New York as practicing the rule that “[a] jury is
never to be invoked, unless specially demanded by one of the par-
ties.”18  His confusion would soon seem predictive.
As other states began to merge their courts of law and equity, the
Field Code became their chief model, with many states adopting it
outright or with small variation.19  Iowa partially adopted the Code in
1851, but altered it to become the first state to implement a jury-
waiver default.20  The reason for this alteration is unclear, but may
have been the result of peculiarities in the state constitution that pre-
vented the drafters from fully merging courts of law and equity.21
Still, Iowa’s version proved influential, with Nebraska adopting an
identical version six years later, complete with automatic waiver.22
Following the Civil War, Virginia and Connecticut adopted their own
versions of automatic waiver in 187123 and 1879,24 respectively.  Alter-
natively, some states adopted the Field Code but maintained a jury-
trial default. But some of these states imposed jury fees that parties
needed to pay in advance, thereby achieving the same result as an
14. See Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an
Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311, 334 (1988).
15. Id. at 327.
16. For a review of this history, see Rene´e Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Pre-
serving Constitutional Rights to Civil Jury Trial, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 831 (2014).
17. Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 207 (1848).
18. Id.
19. See Kellen Funk & Lincoln A. Mullen, The Spine of American Law: Digital Text Analysis
and U.S. Legal Practice 123 AM. HIST. REV. 132 (Feb. 2018) (outlining state adoption of the
Field Code).
20. See IOWA CODE § 1772 (1851).
21. See CHARLES MCGUFFEY HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEAD-
ING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND 97 (1897) (noting that Iowa’s version was prompted by a per-
ceived constitutional requirement).
22. See NEB. CODE § 1772 (1857).
23. Act of 1871, c. 57, § 38, 1871 Va. Acts 53.
24. Act of 1879, §29, 1879 Conn. Spec. Acts 156.
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automatic wavier rule.25  Finally, some states that maintained the jury-
trial default began to recognize forms of jury waiver that went beyond
those statutorily recognized in the Code.26
The Field Code also proved a model to the initial advisory commit-
tee charged with developing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
the early twentieth century.27  But like some of the state reformers in
the preceding century, the advisory committee altered the Code to
reflect a jury-waiver default.  The committee viewed this as an impera-
tive change.  Charles E. Clark—often considered the chief architect of
the Federal Rules—vehemently championed automatic waiver, writ-
ing frequently about its benefits and listing it alongside other reforms
he considered vital.28  Later, he would call Rule 38(b) “one of the best
and most necessary features of the new system.”29  Other members of
the advisory committee, too, wrote about the need for a jury-waiver
default.30  They argued that this approach would increase administra-
tive efficiency through limiting the instances in which a court would be
required to determine the extent of the jury right, and  preventing a
party from strategically wielding the right.
Both of these concerns arose out of confusion at the time over the
breadth of the jury right in merged courts of law and equity.  Judges
had struggled to determine when juries were required under their
states’ code systems.  For instance, Justice Cardozo struggled to deter-
mine the extent of the jury right under New York’s Field Code in
three cases involving equitable counterclaims to suits for damages,
with each case producing a different result.31  It was unclear to what
extent claims of law and equity “merged,” and thus whether jury ver-
dicts should be treated as binding or advisory.  In response to these
outcomes, some skeptics warned that in merged courts “[t]he wishes
of the parties, or guesses of the trial judges, rather than the Constitu-
tion, will determine [the extent of the jury right].”32
25. See Fleming James, Jr., Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YALE
L.J. 1022, 1025 n.21 (1936); Lerner, supra note 16, at 831 (acknowledging this effect).
26. See Lerner, supra note 16, at 831.
27. Subrin, supra note 14, at 312.
28. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure II. Plead-
ings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1323 (1935); Charles E. Clark, The New Illinois Civil Prac-
tice Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 213 (1933); CHARLES E. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 70 (1928);
Charles E. Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration, 2 CONN. B.J. 211, 227 (1928); Charles E.
Clark, Trial of Actions Under Code, 11 CORNELL L.Q. 482, 483–84 (1926).
29. Charles E. Clark, The Nebraska Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 NEB. L. REV. 307, 319 (1942).
30. See e.g., James, supra note 25, at 1025.
31. O.L. McCaskill, Jury Demands in the New Federal Procedure, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 321
(1940) (outlining the results and the confusion).
32. Id. at 329.
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The advisory committee was conscientious of this difficulty and pro-
posed automatic waiver as a method of simply avoiding the issue.
James Fleming, a Yale Professor and one of the advisory committee’s
research assistants, wrote that “[jury-waiver default] contains a clear
direction which will forestall judicial worry as to possible complica-
tions anent the mode of trial.”33  Additionally, Clark contended that
automatic waiver eliminated the need for a judge to “recall that once
there was an historic struggle between Coke and Ellesmere . . . [, un-
less] a claim for jury trial is actually made.”34  “The remote danger
that a possible litigant may at some time be deprived of his jury trial
right by a failure of the court to perceive some of the historical conno-
tations of his case,” he added, “is too unsubstantial a basis to justify
ancient formalism in pleading in all cases,” especially if the parties are
indifferent to the mode of dispute resolution.35
By avoiding the issue in most cases, the authors maintained that
automatic waiver prevented wily litigants from taking advantage of
judicial confusion.  Clark frequently made this point, arguing that “[a]
necessary consequence of the original code provision allowing a liti-
gant, even if indifferent, to rely on his jury right . . . is that he may use
the right to jockey for procedural advantages.”36  That is, an opportu-
nistic litigant might submit his dispute to a judge, “gambl[ing] on the
result and, by keeping his position ambiguous, be able to assert his
claim for a jury after he has lost out on trial to the judge.”37  There
were a handful of cases exemplifying precisely such jockeying in those
states maintaining the unaltered Field Code, and the advisory commit-
tee members frequently cited them as evidencing the necessity of a
jury-waiver default.38  Early waiver meant less opportunity for
mischief.
The committee’s willingness to resolve these administrative con-
cerns through automatic waiver is telling of their views on the jury as
an institution.  As one scholar recognized, “Virtually everyone con-
nected with urging uniform procedural rules denigrated juries.”39
Clark was particularly hostile, seeming “to have preferred equity to
law simply because of the opportunity it offered to avoid jury trial.”40
He disparaged it as the “town hall method of trying cases,” and
33. James, supra note 25, at 1040.
34. Clark, The New Illinois Civil Practice Act, supra note 28, at 213.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 28, at 70.
37. Clark & Moore, supra note 28, at 1297.
38. See, e.g., Jackson v. Strong, 222 N.Y. 149, 152–53 (1917).
39. Subrin, supra note 10, at 968.
40. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927–1960, at 21 (1986).
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claimed that juries “injected an element of rigidity—of arbitrary
right—into a system wherein general rules of convenience should pre-
vail.”41  Other committee members were no kinder.  Edson Sunder-
land, for instance, published a hypercritical article aptly titled The
Inefficiency of the American Jury.42  And when Fleming whittled the
core objectives of united procedure down to just three, number two
read:
The right of jury trial should not be expanded.  This method of set-
tling disputes is expensive, dilatory—perhaps anachronistic.  In-
deed, the number of jury trials should be cut down if this can be
done so as to not jeopardize the attainment of other objectives.43
Of course, the advisory committee could not do away with civil ju-
ries altogether.  Not only did the Seventh Amendment stand in their
way, but also Congress had explicitly warned that it would not accept
a united procedure that limited the jury right.44  The drafters insin-
cerely heeded that instruction.  A review of the minutes from their
discussions reveals oft-repeated concerns about the need to maintain
the appearance of protecting the right, even joking about Congress’
misguided wisdom.45  To be sure, “[w]hen one member observed that
they were drafting a code primarily for ‘actions tried by the court,’
rather than a jury, no one disagreed.”46  The jury was a speed bump
that the drafters sought to surreptitiously dispose.
The committee was well aware that a jury-waiver default would de-
crease the number of jury trials.  Clark had conducted empirical re-
search on the number of jury trials in New York and Connecticut, and
attributed Connecticut’s dramatically lower rate to its automatic
waiver rule.47  In other writings, he acknowledged that under a jury-
waiver default judges were more likely to sit without juries “since in-
ertia leads to waiver and not to jury trial as under the old system.”48
This was no great observation; Clark’s Contemporaries also acknowl-
edged this effect.49  One even proclaimed: “The most effective device
41. CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 28, at 53.
42. Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICH. L. REV. 302, 302
(1915).
43. James, supra note 25, at 1026.
44. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(2012)).
45. Subrin, supra note 10, at 972.
46. Id. at 973.
47. Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration, supra note 28, at 227.
48. See Clark, The New Illinois Civil Practice Act, supra note 28, at 212.
49. See, e.g., James A. Pike & Henry G. Fisher, Pleadings and Jury Rights in the New Federal
Procedure, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 647 (1940) (noting that “the formula has changed from inertia
= jury trial, to inertia = no jury trial”).
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yet evolved for effectuating a more limited use of the jury and yet
which preserves the constitutional right is that of requiring a party to
make a timely demand or be deemed to have waived his rights.”50
Automatic waiver offered a way to limit the number of jury trials
without alarming skeptics or Congress.
As this history demonstrates, the jury-waiver default was foreign to
common law, unnecessary to merged courts of law and equity, and
borne out of the advisory committee’s desire to limit confusion and
curb civil jury trials.  While the federal rule requiring an affirmative
jury demand has undergone some changes since it was adopted in
1938, these changes have concerned only the time at which a party
needs to make the demand.51  It appears the committee has never con-
sidered adopting a jury-trial default—that is, until Justice Gorsuch
and Judge Graber submitted their proposal.
II. THE BENEFITS OF A JURY-TRIAL DEFAULT RULE
The three core reasons animating Justice Gorsuch and Judge Gra-
ber’s jury-trial default recommendation are: First, the rule will in-
crease the number of jury trials; second, the rule will increase
simplicity and certainty with respect to removed cases; and third, the
rule is more true to the spirit of the Seventh Amendment.52  Only the
second and third claims are persuasive.
A. A Jury-Trial Default is Unlikely to Increase Jury Trials
Although adopting a federal jury-waiver default initially decreased
the number of jury trials, it is not clear that altering the rule now
would reverse the trend.  True, the proposed rule slightly increases
costs on parties seeking to avoid juries.  But there are far more salient
factors contributing to the dearth of jury trials today than default iner-
tia.  These factors include the Federal Rules’ emphasis on discovery,
the rise in managerial judging, and the relaxed summary judgment
standard.  Moreover, a review of states with different default rules
reveals no meaningful change in jury trial rates.53  Thus, despite the
judges’ claims, the proposed rule is unlikely to rejuvenate the
institution.
Often overlooked in the discussion on the jury’s decline is that the
number of civil trials generally—bench and jury—has been decreasing
50. Harry W. Henry, The Proposed Code of Civil Procedure for Missouri Parties and Plead-
ings, 7 MO. L. REV. 1, 6 (1942).
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38 advisory committee’s notes.
52. Suggestion 16-CV-F, supra note 1.
53. See infra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
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steadily for almost eighty years.  The proportion of federal civil cases
concluding in trial has fallen as such: 15.2% in 1940; 12% in 1952;
9.1% in 1982; 3.5% in 1992; 1.2% in 2002.  It has roughly remained at
1.2% for the past decade and a half.54  Importantly, since 1987 there
have been fewer bench trials than jury trials at the federal level.55  The
jury-waiver default in the Federal Rules has remained constant during
this period, strongly suggesting that it is not a major contributing fac-
tor to the phenomenon.
A better answer for the decline is that the Federal Rules have made
trials unnecessary.  At common law, a trial was the only opportunity
litigants had to discover facts about their dispute, as the pretrial pro-
cess was largely dedicated to keeping order among the writs.56  Courts
of equity allowed litigants to conduct some level of what we might
think of today as discovery, but it was very limited.57  The Federal
Rules changed this, dramatically expanding discovery into a sophisti-
cated investigatory process for all trials.  This made it no longer neces-
sary for parties to wait until trial to understand the strengths and
weakness of their case, freeing them to enter into informed settle-
ments and making trials redundant.58  In fact, in a recent speech Jus-
tice Gorsuch pithily acknowledged: “Not long ago, we used to have
trials without discovery: Now we have discovery without trials.”59
But the Federal Rules did more than just expand discovery.  They
also allowed for liberal joinder of parties and claims, precipitating the
need for judges to assume a more managerial role.60  In the 1960s, to
facilitate case management, the judiciary abandoned master calendars
and adopted an individual assignment system such that a single judge
handled a case from filing to finish.61  At the same time, the courts
issued a handbook encouraging judges to adopt a process of extensive
pretrial conferencing, designed to help them oversee discovery and to
identify and refine issues.62  This managerial role for judges allowed
54. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460–63 (2004).
55. Id.
56. John H. Langbien, The Disappearance of Civil Trial, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 525 (2012).
57. Id. at 525–26.
58. For a review of how discovery has affected trial rates, see Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing
Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 691, 716 (1998).
59. Tony Mauro, In Speech Notes, Neil Gorsuch Painted a Dark Picture of Litigation, NAT’L
L.J. (Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202781242573/.
60. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 377 (1982).
61. Id.
62. Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351
(1960).
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them to shape litigation and pressure parties toward agreement.63
The 1983 revisions to Rule 16 codified this responsibility, listing “facil-
itating settlement” as a core objective of pretrial conferencing.64  Tri-
als were no longer the process of resolving disputes, but rather the
result of a breakdown in the process.
Three years later, in 1986, the Supreme Court’s reframing of Rule
56’s summary judgment standard further curtailed the number of tri-
als.  In a trilogy of decisions, the Court empowered judges to dismiss
cases in which no genuine dispute of material fact existed so as to
necessitate a trial.65  Before the trilogy, summary judgment was used
sparingly, and was even described as a “toothless tiger.”66  Post-tril-
ogy, however, judges were emboldened, resulting in a statistically sig-
nificant increase in the number of summary judgment motions made,
the frequency with which such motions were granted, and the rate at
which they were affirmed on appeal.67  While some scholars quibble
with the extent to which the trilogy has influenced the overall decline
in trials,68 it is clear that fewer federal cases are proceeding to trial as
a result of the new summary judgment standard.69
Scholars have offered many explanations beyond these three to ex-
plain the decline.70  But a review of the scholarship finds no recent
writer suggesting that the jury-waiver default rule has had any effect.71
Moreover, although statistics of state jury trial rates are often incon-
sistent or unavailable, there does not appear to be any substantial dif-
ference in rates between those states employing the two defaults.  For
instance, in 2007, of the states with broadly applicable jury-trial de-
63. Resnik, supra note 60, at 376–77.
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a).
65. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578–80 (1986); Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 244–47 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
319–323 (1986).
66. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1023–24,
1055–56 (2003).
67. Id. at 1050.
68. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The 25th Anniversary of the Summary Judgment Trilogy:
Much Ado About Very Little, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 561 (2012).
69. Certain types of cases are dismissed with greater frequency, such as antitrust, libel, RICO,
securities fraud, civil rights, products liability, and age discrimination actions. See Miller, supra
note 66, at 1052–53.
70. See SUJA THOMAS, THIS MISSING AMERICAN JURY 32–37 (2016) (advancing a theory of
doctrinal insufficiency).
71. The most recent identified reference to the jury-diminishing effect of the waiver default
came in 1952. See ROBERT WYNESS, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 262 (1952) (“The necessity of an explicit demand as a condition of jury trial has
done much toward diminishing the incidence of that mode of trial.”).
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faults,72 only Alabama held jury trials at a noteworthy rate.73  While
this is far from conclusive and additional research is encouraged, these
figures further undermine the notion that the proposed rule will in-
crease the number of jury trials, especially enough to justify adoption
on that basis alone.  Nevertheless, there are other benefits.
B. A Jury-Trial Default May Increase Simplicity and Certainty
As Justice Gorsuch and Judge Graber note in their recommenda-
tion, a jury-trial default would be simpler to administer with respect to
cases removed to federal court.  Federal Rule 81(c)(3)’s procedure for
demanding a jury trial in removed cases is complicated, making inad-
vertent waiver more likely.  This has sparked disparate judicial ap-
proaches for granting discretionary relief from jury waiver under
Federal Rule 39(b).  A jury-trial default would simplify this process
and make litigants more certain they will receive their desired mode
of dispute resolution.
Justice Gorsuch and Judge Graber are not the first to acknowledge
the shortcomings of Rule 81(c)(3).  The rule has been called “poorly
crafted” with “needless complexity,” and a “trap for the unwary.”74  A
quick review of its terms demonstrates why.  Rule 81(c)(3)(A) re-
quires that in removed actions, “a party who, before removal, ex-
pressly demanded a jury trial in accordance with state law need not
renew the demand after removal.”75  However, “if the state law did
not require an express demand for a jury trial, a party need not make
one after removal unless the court orders the parties to do so.”76  Rule
81(c)(3)(B) goes on to state that if “all necessary pleadings have been
served at the time of removal,” a party must demand a jury trial
within fourteen days after it files notice of removal or is served notice
of removal, with failure to do so resulting in waiver.77
72. States with broad jury-trial default rules include: Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-38, 9-
11-39 (2007); Minnesota, MINN. R. CIV. P. 38.02; Mississippi, MISS. R. CIV. P. 38(a); Missouri,
MO. R. CIV. P. 38(a); and Oregon, OR. R. CIV. P. 51.  Some states, such as Nebraska, have
different default rules for different types of courts. See Jacobson v. Shresta, 849 N.W.2d 515
(Neb. 2014).
73. See National Center for State Courts, Highlighting Aspects of the National Center for State
Courts Civil Justice Reform Initiative, 6 CIVIL ACTION, no. 1, 2007, at 1–4 (average number of
trials per 100,000 population for jury-waiver default courts was 15.7, with Alabama holding 59.2).
74. See generally Susan M. Halpern, Federal Rule 81(c) and Jury Demand in a Removed Ac-
tion: A Procedural Trap for the Unwary, 47 ALB. L. REV. 623, 628 (1983) (outlining and collect-
ing criticisms).
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(3)(A).
76. Id.
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(3)(B).
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Some issues should be immediately apparent.  First, Rule
81(c)(3)(A)’s incorporation of state law overlooks the variety of jury
demand provisions, particularly as to when a demand must be made.
Some states, Nevada and New York for instance, require a demand
but not until later in the proceedings.78  Rule 81(c)(3)(A) is set in the
present tense—“if the state law did not require an express demand for
a jury trial”—seemingly setting the reference point at the time of re-
moval, such that if a demand was not yet necessary the rule is not
implicated.  But courts have taken different approaches.  The Ninth
Circuit has held that the rule applies if a state requires a jury-demand
at any time.79  The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has held that the
rule does not apply if a demand was not yet necessary under state law,
holding Rule 38(b) is implicated instead.80  Neither of these ap-
proaches is required by the text of Rule 81(c)(3)(A).
The more glaring issue is that Rule 81(c)(3)(B) does not address the
situation in which a case is removed prior to “all necessary pleadings”
being served.  An example is if the case is removed prior to a defen-
dant filing an answer.  The response to this omission has been yet an-
other judicial gloss, holding that under such circumstances Rule 38(b)
kicks in and provides a party ten days after the last pleading is
served—for instance, a defendant’s answer—to make a jury de-
mand.81  Failure to do so results in wavier under Rule 38(d).  Again,
this approach is not dictated by the Rules.  The result is that a mis-
informed litigant—thinking she can demand a jury trial at a later date
based on her state’s more liberal rules—may inadvertently waive her
right to trial by jury.  Even an experienced attorney might make this
mistake.
Rule 81’s complexity has made discretionary relief under Rule
39(b) a necessary safety valve.  That rule states that when no demand
is made, “the court may, on motion, order a jury trial on any issue for
which a jury might have been demanded.”82  But courts employ dispa-
rate standards here, too.  The Ninth Circuit, for instance, requires
something beyond inadvertence or mere oversight in order to justify
discretionary relief.83  Alternatively, the Second Circuit provides more
“play in the joints,” reviewing whether the untimely jury demand will
cause prejudice to the defendants or interference with the court’s
78. NEV. R. CIV. P. 38(b); N.Y. CPLR § 4102(a).
79. See, e.g., Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 556 (1983).
80. See, e.g., Cascone v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 702 F.2d 389, 392–93 (2d Cir. 1983).
81. See, e.g., Lutz v. Glendale Union High Sch., 403 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2005).
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(b).
83. See, e.g., Pac. Fisheries Corp. v. HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ltd., 239 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir.
2001).
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schedule.84  These disparate standards increase litigant uncertainty,
making them reliant on judicial discretion to determine whether they
will receive their legitimately desired jury trial.
Justice Gorsuch and Judge Graber’s jury-trial default proposal of-
fers a solution.  Rule 81(c) might be adjusted such that a litigant
would be entitled to a jury trial as of right in all cases removed to
federal court, regardless of intentional or inadvertent waiver prior to
removal.  True, this approach would result in duplicative waiver filings
and perhaps even inadvertent jury trials, but there is a simple solution.
Should there be any question as to whether a bench trial is desired,
the judge could simply inquire during pretrial conferencing.  The 1963
advisory notes to Rule 81 already suggest “a district court may find it
convenient to establish a routine practice of [directing the parties to
state whether they demand a jury].”85  The additional time required to
make this determination would be insignificant, and would be out-
weighed by the benefit of ensuring litigants’ Seventh Amendment
rights.
C. A Jury-Trial Default is Truer to the Constitution
Perhaps the most significant benefit of adopting Justice Gorsuch
and Judge Graber’s proposal would be symbolic.  Default rules project
systemic values, signaling desired outcomes and gently nudging to-
ward them.86  The current automatic waiver rule paints the jury as
merely an individual right, which is a perspective unmoored from the
original intent of the Seventh Amendment.  The Framers viewed the
jury as a fundamental political institution, one in which civic participa-
tion was realized and community norms injected into the administra-
tion of justice.87  Adopting a jury-trial default would better
acknowledge this structural and public role.  It would simultaneously
ensure litigants’ procedural autonomy, while also respecting the jury
as a constitutional actor.
The current automatic rule could not be more out of step with the
history of the Seventh Amendment.  Under colonial rule, the jury
served as a key channel through which colonists exercised local and
democratic control against the distant and unrepresentative Crown.88
84. See, e.g., Cascone, 702 F.2d at 392.
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 81 advisory committee’s note to 1963 amendment.
86. For a general discussion on default rules, see Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery
Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1156, 1157 (2013).
87. 87 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 74 (1998).
88. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN.
L. REV. 639, 653–56 (1972).
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In the decades leading up to the Revolution, colonists used the civil
jury both as a shield—for instance, by refusing to enforce civil penal-
ties against smugglers—and as a sword—by awarding smugglers dam-
ages for harms resulting from officers’ searches.89  The Crown
responded by expanding the jurisdiction of juryless tribunals,90 an act
the colonists viewed as tyrannical.91  It even helped motivate the
Revolution, with the Founders specifically accusing the Crown in the
Declaration of Independence of “depriving [them] in many cases of
the benefits of trial by jury.”92
Following independence, the Framers constitutionalized the civil
jury in part to serve as a similar bulwark against the new federal gov-
ernment.  Local civil juries were entrusted to check abuses by each of
the three branches of government.93  Most apparent was the civil
jury’s check on the judiciary.  The Founders were wary of unelected
judges, and particularly concerned with their potential for corruption
and state bias.94  By serving as the “lower judicial bench” in a bicam-
eral judiciary,95 the jury tied the hands of judges who might otherwise
have sought to subvert the law.  The civil jury also checked the legisla-
ture by guaranteeing that no national act would be enforced without
first passing through a body of local laymen.96  Finally, the jury
checked the executive by ensuring that those harmed by enforcement
abuses might nevertheless find relief.97  The jury was the lynchpin con-
stitutional actor for ensuring the enumerated rights.98
Involving citizens in the administration of justice also had intended
socio-political benefits.  Serving on a jury was seen as an excludable
political right, not entirely different from the right to vote for or serve
89. See, e.g., Erving v. Cradock (Mass. 1761) reprinted in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF
CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE
OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 553 (Boston 1865).
90. See, e.g., Stamp Act, 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 12 (Eng.); Townshend Revenue Act, 1767, 7 Geo. 3
(Eng.).
91. 91 See RESOLUTIONS OF THE STAMP ACT CONGRESS (1765), reprinted in SOURCES OF
OUR LIBERTIES 270–71 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959) (“[The Stamp Act], and
several other acts, by extending the jurisdiction of the courts of admiralty beyond its ancient
limits, have a manifest tendency to subvert the rights and liberties of the colonists.”).
92. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776).
93. See generally SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY 43–48 (2016).
94. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, ON DEMOCRACY 61–66 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1939) (noting the
benefits of “twelve honest men” over permanent judges).
95. JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES 209 (W. Stark ed., Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1950) (1814).
96. See, e.g., Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension Between Legislative
Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 351–52 (1995).
97. See AMAR, supra note 87, at 74, 88.
98. Id. at 108.
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in elected office.99  To be a juror meant that you were a citizen entitled
to full democratic participation—a shamefully narrow class at the
founding and throughout much of American history.100  What is more,
the jury box served as a place to teach and practice that participation.
Alexis de Tocqueville famously described the jury as “a gratuitous
public school” that “instill[s] some of the habits of the judicial mind
into every citizen.”101  He added that it “teaches every man not to
recoil before the responsibility of his own actions and impresses him
with that manly confidence without which no political virtue can ex-
ist.”102  Jury service was a democratic and virtue enhancing activity
that was meant to strengthen the young nation.
Considering these foundations, it might be surprising that jury
waiver is permitted at all.  Allowing private citizens to unilaterally by-
pass a public institution, thereby disenfranchising citizens and aggran-
dizing the judiciary, should strike us as somewhat problematic.  When
the law develops without democratic input, it becomes detached from
community norms.103  This is a particular threat when the bench is
woefully unrepresentative of the nation’s populace, as is our own.104
Also, citizens lose out on the educational and the emboldening experi-
ence of serving as a juror.105  This should not be shrugged away.  Data
shows that citizens who serve on juries are more likely to vote and
have higher rates of general civic engagement.106  Excluding them can
cause deep civic apathy.  As Plato warned more than two millennia
ago: “[I]n private suits . . . all should have a share, for he who has no
share in the administration of justice is apt to imagine that he has no
share in the State at all.”107
Importantly, Justice Gorsuch and Judge Graber are not recom-
mending eradicating jury waivers.  That would be out of step with the
99. Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 203, 220–21 (1995).
100. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Jury as Constitutional Identity, 47 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1105, 1119 (2014) (reviewing the history of expanding jury participation rights).
101. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 274 (J.P. Mayer ed., 2000) (1835).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., HARRY KELVIN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 494–95 (1966)
(“The jury in the guise of resolving doubts about the issues of fact, gives reign to its sense of
values.”).
104. See Carl Tobias, Diversity and the Federal Bench, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1197, 1197–98
(2010) (outlining the history of the unrepresentative federal bench).
105. See, e.g., Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381,
2382 (1999) (reviewing the virtues of jury service).
106. See JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PRO-
MOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 128–29 (2010).
107. Plato, Laws IV 768, in 2 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 529 (B. Jowett trans., Random
House rev. ed. 1937)
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liberalization of civil procedure that has defined the last century and
would represent a dramatic curtailment of litigant procedural auton-
omy.108  Instead, they seek to reverse the current rule’s nudge toward
negative and constitutionally unintended consequences.  The current
rule reinforces the myopic view of the jury as little more than one
among many potential adjudicative bodies.  It ignores the need to con-
strain judges in unilaterally extending the common law and disrespects
the value of democratic input.  Changing the rule projects precisely
the opposite.  It acknowledges the jury as a socio-political institution
that should not be discarded by mere accident.  It places systemic iner-
tia toward behavior in line with an original understanding of the Sev-
enth Amendment.109  And perhaps, in some small way, it reminds
litigants that their dispute and its just resolution belong not solely to
them.
III. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF A JURY-TRIAL DEFAULT RULE
Despite the increased simplicity and symbolic benefits, adopting
Justice Gorsuch and Judge Graber’s proposal may carry some undesir-
able consequences.  First, there may be an increased number of pro se
litigants standing before juries, which imposes unique costs on courts.
Furthermore, in cases in which there is disagreement over the extent
of the jury right, judges will be required to issue rulings that they may
not have otherwise.  Finally, there still may be a concern that parties
will try to gain a strategic advantage by hiding their jury trial right.
These concerns are easily addressed by pretrial conferencing and set-
ting reasonable deadlines.
A jury-trial default rule will likely have the biggest impact on pro se
litigants.  For most sophisticated parties it is immaterial whether the
Federal Rules assume a jury-trial or jury-waiver default, as the costs
associated with a desired shift are minimal.110  But for parties unaware
of the rule—as one might reasonably suspect pro se litigants to be—
the effects of the assumed default are pronounced.  Default rules are
most often implicated by those unfamiliar with them.111  Thus, in
108. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 (7th ed. 2008).
109. It is worth noting that some of these ideals are already reflected in other contexts.  For
instance, courts require pre-dispute contractual jury waivers to be knowing, voluntary, and intel-
ligent.  The Supreme Court has been explicit that “[because] the right of jury trial is fundamen-
tal, courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.”  Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex
rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).  It is strange to think that the Constitution tolerates the
disparate standards between contractual waiver and procedural default.
110. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–3 (1960).
111. See CASS R. SUSTEIN, CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE: UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF
CHOICE 7 (2015).
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choosing a rule, policy makers must decide whether to award or penal-
ize low information actors.112  The current rule punishes the unin-
formed with the waiver of a constitutional right.  It takes this position
not based on an assumption of the tacit preferences of uninformed
parties, but because it saves judicial resources.113  Although statistics
are unavailable on how much money is saved by the current rule,
there is concern that a jury-trial default would lead to increased costs
flowing from pro se litigants.
Pro se litigants do multiply the cost of jury trials.  Their unfamiliar-
ity with the intricacies of evidence and trial practice make conducting
jury trials with them “a difficult and arduous task” for judges.114  In a
2011 survey, federal district court judges consistently noted that there
was a “great need” for counsel at trial, as unrepresented litigants often
required overt and repeated instruction.115  The time spent by judges
explaining matters causes delays and may suggest to jurors that the
judge is partial.116  As a result, some hardened judges simply refuse to
“babysit[ ] the pro ses.”117  And as another judge noted: “I would not
suggest any rule change that would encourage more pro se activity
and the added burdens attached thereto.”118
This concern provokes two responses.  First, capitalizing on the ig-
norance of unsophisticated actors is no basis for a rule.  This is partic-
ularly true because the matter concerns a fundamental right that sits
at the center of the Constitution’s structure.  The second, more cynical
response, is that most pro se claims are often dismissed well before
trial anyway.119  The Federal Rules are a minefield for the unrepre-
sented, often resulting in dismissals on technicalities long before the
merits are considered.  In fact, one might suspect that a pro se litigant
who is sophisticated enough to navigate the Federal Rules to trial
would be familiar with the need to demand a jury.  Thus, the increase
in pro se jury trials would likely be modest under a jury-trial default.
112. See J.H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 899, 906–07 (2015).
113. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
114. See e.g., Oko v. Rogers, 466 N.E.2d 658, 661 (Ill. App. 1984) (describing the difficulty of
conducting jury trials with pro se litigants).
115. See DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS
IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT ON SURVEYS OF CLERKS OF THE COURT AND CHIEF
JUDGES 26–27 (2011), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ProSeUSDC.pdf.
116. Id. at 30, 37–38.
117. Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro Se Litigants?, 82 JUDICATURE 13, 19
(1998).
118. Id.
119. See Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 439, 455 (2009).
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The second potential detriment of a jury-trial default is that it may
increase the frequency with which judges must determine whether a
jury trial right exists, thus increasing work and the likelihood of mis-
takes.  Remember, this was one of the rationales Charles E. Clark and
other advisory committee members repeated in justifying automatic
waiver.120  But nearly a century of case law has largely settled any
confusion that early jurists experienced.  For instance, the Supreme
Court settled in Beacon Theatres v. Westover that if a plaintiff brings
an equitable claim and the defendant files a counterclaim at law, the
legal claims must be tried by a jury before the equitable claims can be
resolved.121  In Dairy Queen v. Wood, the Supreme Court clarified
that where a plaintiff seeks both equitable and legal relief, the same
ordering is required.122  Additionally, in Ross v. Bernhard, the Su-
preme Court settled that the jury right attaches to the issue to be tried
rather than the procedural route in which it arises.123  True, these deci-
sions do not address all historical or future controversies, but few
would earnestly suggest that jury trial demands today are a “shot in
the dark.”124
Admittedly, there may be disagreements as to the extent of the jury
trial right and some litigants may overestimate the breadth of the
guarantee. Inefficiencies would result if all actors were not on the
same page as to the mode of trial at some early stage in the proceed-
ings.  The initial advisory committee’s solution to this was to force the
parties to make a demand almost immediately upon filing.  This might
have made sense in an age when trials moved quickly and judges
needed to manage active trial calendars, but this is no longer the case.
The average federal judge tried less than two cases—jury and bench—
between March 31, 2016 and March 31, 2017,125 with a median time
interval of filing to disposition by trial being over two years.126  For
most cases, there is zero administrative benefit to settling the mode of
120. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
121. 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959).
122. 369 U.S. 469, 479 (1962).
123. 396 U.S. 531, 532–33 (1970).
124. Concerns over the extent of the jury right to legislatively created statutory rights persist,
for instance. See Martin H. Redish and Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury
Trial in Non-Article III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 408–09 (1995).
125. Table C-4: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action
Taken, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2017, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. (2017),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_c4_0331.2017.pdf.
126. Table C-5: U.S. District Courts—Median Time Intervals From Filing to Disposition of
Civil Cases Terminated, by District and Method of Disposition, During the 12-Month Period End-
ing March 31, 2017, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
data_tables/fjcs_c5_0331.2017.pdf.
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trial within Rule 38(b)’s fourteen-day time frame.  The mode of trial
could just as easily be settled during pretrial conference along with
other administrative points.  In fact, as mentioned before, the advisory
notes to Rule 81(c) already suggest that judicial involvement is good
practice.127
Finally, concerns may remain that wily litigants may try to gain an
advantage by sitting on their jury right.  But rules already in place can
be slightly modified to prevent this mischief.  Rule 38(d) could be
modified such that past a certain date the mode of dispute resolution
can only be adjusted with the consent of all the parties and the judge,
thereby preserving litigant and institutional resources.128 And Rule
39(b) could be modified to prevent untimely and problematic bench
trial demands, tamping down on the potential for gamesmanship.129
Moreover, to prevent frivolous appeals, it should be assumed that any
litigant who proceeds to trial without objection consents to that form
of trial.  Although this raise-or-waive rule places an affirmative re-
quirement on litigants, it is no different from what is required with
most other procedural deficiencies.130  To be sure, conferencing re-
quirements and time deadlines can quell concerns that a jury-trial de-
fault will somehow wreak havoc.
CONCLUSION
For nearly eighty years, one of the more pernicious Federal Rules
has persisted: if a party does not claim her jury right, she waives it.
This rule was unnecessary at the time and should be changed.  As Jus-
tice Gorsuch and Judge Graber correctly claim in their recommenda-
tion, a jury-trial default is simpler to administer and truer to the
Seventh Amendment.  Any unintended consequences are likely to be
minimal or can be easily addressed.  Perhaps the only insurmountable
obstacle facing this proposal is convincing lawyers and judges to
change.  As Charles E. Clark acknowledged in his 1928 treatise, “re-
form measures should not be obnoxious to the lawyers, for it is the
bench and bar who must work with the rules of practice and plead-
ing.”131  To our stubborn institutions, any change at all may very well
be considered abhorrent.
127. See FED. R. CIV. P. 81 advisory committee’s note to 1963 amendment.
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d).
129. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(b).
130. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976).
131. CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 28, at 35 n.109.
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